Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? The Politics and Policy of Bank Regulation by Jean-Charles Rochet
COPYRIGHT NOTICE: 
Jean-Charles Rochet: Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? 
is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2008, by Princeton 
University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form 
by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information 
storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading 
and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any 
network servers. 
Follow links for Class Use and other Permissions. For more information send email to: 
permissions@pupress.princeton.edu General Introduction and

Outline of the Book

The  recent  episode  of  the  Northern  Rock  bank  panic  in  the  United 
Kingdom, with depositors queuing from 4 a.m. in order to get their 
money out, reminds us that banking crises are a recurrent phenomenon. 
An interesting IMF study back in 1997 identiﬁed 112 systemic banking 
crises in 93 countries and 51 borderline crises in 46 countries between 
1975 and 1995, including the Savings and Loan crisis in the United States 
in the late 1980s, which cost more than $150 billion to the American 
taxpayers. Since then, Argentina, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, 
and many other countries have also experienced systemic banking crises. 
The object of this book is to try and explain why these crises have 
occurred and whether they could be avoided in the future. It is fair to 
say that, in almost every country in the world, public authorities already 
intervene a great deal in the functioning of the banking sector. The two 
main components of this public intervention are on the one hand the 
ﬁnancial safety nets (composed essentially of deposit insurance systems 
and emergency liquidity assistance provided to commercial banks by the 
central bank) and on the other hand the prudential regulation systems, 
consisting mainly of capital adequacy (and liquidity) requirements, and 
exit rules, establishing what supervisory authorities should do when they 
close down a commercial bank. 
This book suggests several ways for reforming the diﬀerent compo­
nents of the regulatory–supervisory system: the lender of last resort 
(part 2), prudential supervision and the management of systemic risk 
(part 3), and solvency regulations (part 4) so that future banking crises 
can be avoided, or at least their frequency and cost can be reduced 
signiﬁcantly. 2  GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
Why Are There So Many Banking Crises? 
Part 1 contains a nontechnical presentation of these banking crises and 
a ﬁrst, easily accessible, discussion of how the regulatory–supervisory 
system could be reformed to limit the frequency and the cost of these 
crises. The main conclusions of this part are the following: 
•	 Althoughmany bankingcrises havebeen initiatedbyﬁnancial dereg­
ulation  and  globalization,  these  crises  were  ampliﬁed  largely  by 
political interference. 
•	 Public intervention in the banking sector faces a fundamental com­
mitment problem, analogous to the time consistency problem con­
fronted by monetary policy. 
•	 The key to successful reform is independence and accountability of 
banking supervisors. 
The Lender of Last Resort 
Part 2 explores the concept of lender of last resort (LLR), which was 
elaborated in the nineteenth century by Thornton (1802) and Bagehot 
(1873). The essential point of the “classical” doctrine associated with 
Bagehot asserts that the LLR role is to lend to “solvent but illiquid” banks 
under certain conditions.  More precisely, the LLR should lend freely 
against good collateral, valued at precrisis levels, and at a penalty rate. 
These conditions can be found in Bagehot (1873) and are also presented, 
for instance, in Humphrey (1975) and Freixas et al. (1999). 
This  policy  was  clearly  eﬀective:  traditional  banking  panics  were 
eliminated with the LLR facility and deposit insurance by the end of 
the nineteenth century in Europe, after the crisis of the 1930s in the 
United States and, by and large, in emerging economies, even though 
they have suﬀered numerous crises until today.1 Modern liquidity crises 
associated with securitized money or capital markets have also required 
the intervention of the LLR. Indeed, the Federal Reserve intervened in 
the crises provoked by the failure of Penn Central in the U.S. commercial 
paper market in 1970, by the stock market crash of October 1987, and by 
Russia’s default in 1997 and subsequent collapse of LTCM (in the latter 
case a “lifeboat” was arranged by the New York Fed). For example, in 
October 1987 the Federal Reserve supplied liquidity to banks through 
the discount window.2 
1See Gorton (1988) for U.S. evidence and Lindgren et al. (1996) for evidence on other 
IMF member countries. 
2See Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1992). See also chapter 7 of this book for a modeling 
of the interactions between the discount window and the interbank market. 3  GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
The LLR’s function of providing emergency liquidity assistance has 
been criticized for provoking moral hazard on the banks’ side.3 Perhaps 
more importantly, Goodfriend and King (1988) (see also Bordo 1990; 
Kaufman  1991;  Schwartz  1992)  remark  that  Bagehot’s  doctrine  was 
elaborated at a time when ﬁnancial markets were underdeveloped. They 
argue  that,  whereas  central  bank  intervention  on  aggregate  liquidity 
(monetary policy) is still warranted, individual interventions (banking 
policy) are not anymore: with sophisticated interbank markets, banking 
policyhasbecomeredundant. GoodfriendandLacker(1999)suggestthat 
commercial banks could instead provide each other with multilateral 
credit lines, remunerated ex ante by commitment fees. 
Part  2  contains  two  articles.  Chapter  2,  written  with  Xavier  Vives, 
provides  a  theoretical  foundation  for  Bagehot’s  doctrine  in  a  model 
that ﬁts the modern context of sophisticated and presumably eﬃcient 
ﬁnancial markets. Our approach bridges a gap between the “panic” and 
“fundamental” views of crises by linking the probability of occurrence of 
a crisis to the fundamentals. We show that in the absence of intervention 
by the central bank, some solvent banks may be forced to liquidate if too 
large a proportion of wholesale deposits are not renewed. 
The second article, chapter 3, written with Xavier Freixas and Bruno 
Parigi, formalizes two common criticisms of the Bagehot doctrine of the 
LLR: that it may be diﬃcult to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent 
banks (Goodhart 1995) and that LLR policies may generate moral hazard. 
They  ﬁnd  that  when  interbank  markets  are  eﬃcient,  there  is  still  a 
potential role for an LLR but only during crisis periods, when market 
spreads are too high. In “normal” times, liquidity provision by interbank 
markets is suﬃcient. 
Prudential Regulation and the Management of Systemic Risk 
Part 3 is dedicated to prudential regulation and the management of sys­
temic risk. Although the topic is still debated in the academic literature 
(see Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Freixas and Rochet (1995), and 
Santos (2000) for extended surveys), a large consensus seems to have 
emerged on the rationale behind bank prudential regulation. It is now 
widely accepted that it has essentially two purposes: 
•	 To protect small depositors, by limiting the frequency and cost of 
individual bank failures. This is often referred to as microprudential 
policy.4 
3However, Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2003) show that, in some cases, moral hazard 
can be reduced by the presence of LLR. 
4See, for example, Borio (2003) or Crockett (2001) for a justiﬁcation for this terminol­
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•	 To protect the banking system as a whole, by limiting the frequency 
and cost of systemic banking crises. This is often referred to as 
macroprudential policy. 
Notice that, from the point of view of economic analysis, these two 
types of policies have very diﬀerent justiﬁcations: 
Microprudential policy is justiﬁed by the (presumed)5  inability of  • 
small depositors to control the use of their money by bankers. This 
iswhymostcountrieshaveorganizeddepositinsurancefunds(DIFs) 
that guarantee small deposits against the risk of failure of their 
bank.6 The role of bank supervisors is then to represent the interests 
of depositors (or rather of the DIF) vis-à-vis banks’ managers and 
shareholders.7 
•	 Macroprudential  policy  is  justiﬁed  by  the  (partial)  failure  of  the 
market to deal with aggregate risks, and by the public good com­
ponent of ﬁnancial stability. As for other public goods, the total 
(declared) willingness to pay of individual banks (or more generally 
of investors) for ﬁnancial stability is less that the social value of this 
ﬁnancial stability. This is because each individual (bank or investor) 
free-rides on the willingness of others to pay for ﬁnancial stability. 
These diﬀerences imply in particular that, while microprudential pol­
icy (and supervision) can in principle be dealt with at a purely private 
level (it amounts to a collective representation problem for depositors), 
macroprudential policy has intrinsically a public good component. This 
being said, governments have traditionally controlled both dimensions 
of prudential policy, which may be the source of serious time consistency 
problems8 (this is because democratic governments cannot commit on 
long-run decisions that will be made by their successors) leading to 
political pressure on supervisors, regulatory forbearance, and misman­
agement of banking crises. 
The ﬁrst article in part 3, chapter 4, builds a simple model of the 
banking industry where both micro and macro aspects of prudential 
policies can be integrated. This model shows that the main cause behind 
the poor management of banking crises may not be the “safety net” per 
5The supporters of the “free banking school” challenge this view. 
6Contrary to what is often asserted, the need for a microprudential regulation is not 
a consequence of any “mispricing” of deposit insurance (or other form of government 
subsidies) but simply of the existence of deposit insurance. 
7This is the “representation theory” of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). 
8A similar time consistency problem used to exist for monetary policy, until indepen­
dence was granted to the central banks of many countries. 5  GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
se as argued by many economists, but instead the lack of commitment 
power of banking authorities, who are typically subject to political pres­
sure. However, the model also shows that the use of private monitors 
(market discipline) is a very imperfect means of solving this commit­
ment  problem.  Instead,  I  argue  in  favor  of  establishing  independent 
and accountable banking supervisors, as has been done for monetary 
authorities. I also suggest a diﬀerential regulatory treatment of banks 
according to the costs and beneﬁts of a potential bailout. In particular, 
I argue that independent banking authorities should make it clear from 
the start (in a credible fashion) that certain banks with an excessive 
exposure to macroshocks should be denied the access to emergency 
liquidity assistance by the central bank. By contrast, banks that have 
access to the LLR either because they have a reasonable exposure to 
macroshocks or because they are too big to fail should face a special 
regulatory treatment, with increased capital ratio and deposit insurance 
premium (or liquidity requirements). 
The three other articles in part 3 study the mechanisms of propagation 
of failure from one bank to other banks, or even to the banking system 
as a whole. 
Chapter 5, written with Jean Tirole, shows that “peer-monitoring,” i.e., 
the notion that banks should monitor each other, as a complement to 
centralized monitoring by a public supervisor, is central to the risk of 
propagation of bank failures through interbank markets. 
Chapter 6, also written with Jean Tirole, studies the risk of propagation 
of bank failures through large-value interbank payment systems. 
Finally, chapter 7, written with Xavier Freixas and Bruno Parigi, shows 
that the architecture of the ﬁnancial system, and in particular the matrix 
of interbank relations has a large impact on the resilience of the banking 
system and its ability to absorb systemic shocks. This paper is related 
to several important papers on the sources of fragility of the banking 
system, notably Allen and Gale (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2001), and 
Goodhart et al. (2006). 
Solvency Regulations 
Part 4 contains three articles, which are all concerned with the regula­
tion of banks’ solvency, and more precisely with the ﬁrst and second 
Basel Accords. The ﬁrst Basel Accord, elaborated in July 1988 by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), required internationally 
active banks from the G10 countries to hold a minimum total capital 
equal to 8% of risk-adjusted assets. It was later amended to cover market 
risks. It has been revised by the BCBS, which has released for comment 6  GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
several proposals of amendment, commonly referred to as Basel II (Basel 
Committee 1999, 2001, 2003). 
The ﬁrst article, chapter 8, is mainly concerned with the possibilities of 
regulatory arbitrage implied by this ﬁrst accord. It shows that improperly 
chosen risk weights induce banks to select ineﬃcient portfolios and 
to undertake regulatory arbitrage activities which might paradoxically 
result in increased risk taking.9 
This article belongs to a strand of the theoretical literature (e.g., Fur­
long and Keeley 1990; Kim and Santomero 1988; Koehn and Santomero 
1980; Thakor 1996) focusing on the distortion of the allocation of the 
banks’ assets that could be generated by the wedge between market 
assessment of asset risks and its regulatory counterpart in Basel I. 
Hellman et al. (2000) argue in favor of reintroducing interest rate ceil­
ings on deposits as a complementary instrument to capital requirements 
for mitigating moral hazard. By introducing these ceilings, the regulator 
increases the franchise value of the banks (even if they are not currently 
binding) which relaxes the moral hazard constraint. Similar ideas are put 
forward in Caminal and Matutes (2002). 
The  empirical  literature  (e.g.,  Bernanke  and  Lown  (1991);  see  also 
Thakor (1996), Jackson et al. (1999), and the references therein) has tried 
to relate these theoretical arguments to the spectacular (yet apparently 
transitory) substitution of commercial and industrial loans by invest­
ment in government securities in U.S. banks in the early 1990s, shortly 
after the implementation of the Basel Accord and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA).10 
Hancock et al. (1995) study the dynamic response to shocks in the 
capital of U.S. banks using a vector autoregressive framework. They show 
that U.S. banks seem to adjust their capital ratios much faster than they 
adjust their loan portfolios. Furﬁne (2001) extends this line of research 
by building a structural dynamic model of banks’ behavior, which is 
calibrated on data from a panel of large U.S. banks for the period 1990– 
97. He suggests that the credit crunch cannot be explained by demand 
eﬀects but rather by the rise in capital requirements and/or the increase 
in regulatory monitoring. He also uses his calibrated model to simulate 
the eﬀects of Basel II and suggests that its implementation would not 
provoke a second credit crunch, given that average risk weights on good 
quality commercial loans will decrease if Basel II is implemented. 
9These activities are analyzed in detail in Jones (2000). 
10Peek and Rosengren (1995) ﬁnd that the increase in supervisory monitoring also had 
a signiﬁcant impact on bank lending decisions, even after controlling for bank capital 
ratios. Blum and Hellwig (1995) analyze the macroeconomic implications of bank capital 
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The other two articles in part 4 focus on the reform of the Basel 
Accord  (nicknamed  Basel  II),  which  relies  on  three  “pillars”:  capital 
adequacy requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. Yet, 
as shown in chapter 9, the interaction between these three instruments 
is  far  from  being  clear.  The  recourse  to  market  discipline  is  rightly 
justiﬁed by common sense arguments about the increasing complexity 
of banking activities and the impossibility for banking supervisors to 
monitor in detail these activities. It is therefore legitimate to encourage 
monitoring of banks by professional investors and ﬁnancial analysts as 
a complement to banking supervision. Similarly, a notion of gradualism 
in  regulatory  intervention  is  introduced  (in  the  spirit  of  the  reform 
of  U.S.  banking  regulation,  following  the  FDIC  Improvement  Act  of 
1991). It is suggested that commercial banks should, under “normal 
circumstances,”  maintain  economic  capital  way  above  the  regulatory 
minimum and that supervisors could intervene if this is not the case. 
Yet, and somewhat contradictorily, while the proposed reform states 
very precisely the complex reﬁnements of the risk weights to be used 
in the computation of this regulatory minimum, it remains silent on the 
other intervention thresholds. 
The  third  article,  chapter  10,  written  with  Jean-Paul  Décamps  and 
Benoît Roger, analyzes formally the interaction between the three pillars 
of Basel II in a dynamic model. It also suggests that regulators should 
put more emphasis on implementation issues and institutional reforms. 
Market Discipline versus Regulatory Intervention 
Let me conclude this introductory chapter by discussing an important 
topic that is absent from the papers collected here, namely the respective 
roles  of  market  discipline  and  regulatory  intervention.  Conceptually, 
market discipline can be used by banking authorities in two diﬀerent 
ways: 
•	 Direct market discipline, which aims at inducing market investors to 
inﬂuence11 the behavior of bank managers, and works as a substitute 
for prudential supervision. 
•	 Indirect market discipline, which aims at inducing market investors 
to monitor  the behavior of bank managers, and works as a com­
plement to prudential supervision. The idea is that indirect market 
discipline provides new, objective information that can be used by 
supervisors not only to improve their control on problem banks but 
11This distinction between inﬂuencing and monitoring is due to Bliss and Flannery 
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also to implement prompt corrective action (PCA) measures that 
limit forbearance. 
The instruments for implementing market discipline are essentially of 
three types: 
•	 Imposing more transparency, i.e., forcing bank managers to disclose 
publicly various types of information that can be used by market 
participants for a better assessment of banks’ management. 
•	 Changing the liability structure of banks, e.g., forcing bank managers 
to issue periodically subordinated debt. 
•	 Using market information to improve the eﬃciency of supervision. 
We now examine these three types of instruments. 
Imposing More Transparency 
In  a  recent  empirical  study  of  disclosure  in  banking,  Baumann  and 
Nier (2003) ﬁnd that more disclosure tends to be beneﬁcial to banks: 
it  decreases  stock  volatility,  increases  market  values,  and  increases 
the usefulness of accounting data. However, as argued by D’Avolio et 
al. (2001): “market mechanisms…are unlikely themselves to solve the 
problems raised by misleading information.... For the future of ﬁnancial 
marketsintheUnitedStates,disclosure[ofaccurateinformation]islikely 
to be critical for continued progress.” In other words, ﬁnancial markets 
will not by themselves generate enough information for investors to 
allocate their funds appropriately and eﬃciently, and in some occasions 
will even tend to propagate misleading information. This means that 
disclosure of accurate information has to be imposed by regulators. 
A good example of such regulations are the disclosure requirements 
imposed in the United States by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(and in other countries by the agencies regulating security exchanges) 
for publicly traded companies. However, the banking sector is peculiar 
in two respects: banks’ assets are traditionally viewed as “opaque,”12 
and banks are subject to regulation and supervision, which implies that 
bank supervisors are already in possession of detailed information on 
the banks’ balance sheets. Thus it may seem strange to require public 
disclosure of information already possessed by regulatory authorities: 
12Morgan (2002) provides indirect empirical evidence on this opacity by comparing the 
frequency of disagreements among bond-rating agencies about the values of ﬁrms across 
sectors of activity. He shows that these disagreements are much more frequent, all else 
being equal, for banks and insurance companies than for other sectors of the economy. 9  GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
why can’t these authorities disclose the information themselves,13  or 
even publish their regulatory ratings (BOPEC, CAMELS, and the like)? 
There are basically two reasons for this: 
•	 First, as argued in chapter 2, too much disclosure may trigger bank 
runs and/or systemic banking crises. This happens in any situation 
where  coordination  failures  may  occur  between  many  dispersed 
investors. 
•	 Second, as we explain below, the crucial beneﬁt of market discipline 
is to limit the possibilities of regulatory forbearance by generating 
“objective” information that can be used to force supervisors to 
intervene before it is too late when a bank is in trouble. This would 
not be possible if the information was disclosed by the supervisors 
themselves. 
In any case, there are intrinsic limits to transparency in banking: we 
have torecallthatthe main economicrole ofbanksispreciselytoallocate 
funds to projects of small and medium enterprises that are “opaque” to 
outside investors. If these projects were transparent, commercial banks 
would not be needed in the ﬁrst place. 
Changing the Liability Structure of Banks 
The economic idea behind direct market discipline is that, by changing 
the liability structure of banks (e.g., forcing banks to issue uninsured 
debt of a certain maturity),14  one can change the incentives of bank 
managers  and  shareholders.  In  particular,  some  proponents  of  the 
mandatory subdebt proposal claim that informed investors have the 
possibility to “inﬂuence” bank managers. This idea has been discussed 
extensively in the academic literature on corporate ﬁnance: short-term 
debt can in theory be used to mitigate the debt overhang problem (Myers 
1984) and the free cash ﬂow problem (Jensen 1986). In the banking 
literature,CalomirisandKahn(1991)andCarletti(1999)haveshownhow 
demandable debt could be used in theory to discipline bank managers. 
The  subdebt  proposal  has  been  analyzed  formally  in  only  very  few 
articles: Levonian (2001) uses a Black–Scholes–Merton type of model 
13One could also argue that the information of supervisors is “proprietary” information 
that could be used inappropriately by the bank’s competitors if publicly disclosed. This 
is not an argument against regulatory disclosure since regulators can select which pieces 
of information they disclose. 
14The “subordinated debt proposal” is discussed, for example, in Calomiris (1998, 
1999), Evanoﬀ (1993), Evanoﬀ and Wall (2000), Gorton and Santomero (1990), and Wall 
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(where the bank’s return on assets and closure date are exogenous) to 
show that mandatory subdebt is typically not a good way to prevent 
bankers from taking too much risk.15  Décamps et al. (chapter 10) and 
Rochet (chapter 9) modify this model by endogenizing the bank’s return 
on  assets  and  closure  date.  They  ﬁnd  that  under  certain  conditions 
(suﬃciently long maturity of the debt, suﬃcient liquidity of the subdebt 
market, limited scope for asset substitution by the bank managers) man­
dating a periodic issuance of subordinated debt could allow regulators 
to reduce equity requirements (tier 1). However, it would always increase 
total capital requirements (tier 1 + tier 2). 
In any case, empirical evidence for direct market discipline is weak: 
Bliss and Flannery (2001) ﬁnd very little support for equity or bond 
holders inﬂuencing U.S. bank holding companies.16 It is true that stud­
ies of crisis periods—either in the recent crises in emerging countries 
(Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001; Calomiris and Powell 2000), during 
the Great Depression (Calomiris and Mason 1997), or the U.S. Savings 
and Loan crisis (Park and Peristiani 1998)—have found that in extreme 
circumstances depositors and other investors were able to distinguish 
between  “good”  banks  and  “bad”  banks  and  “vote  with  their  feet.” 
There is no doubt indeed that depositors and private investors have 
the possibility to provoke bank closures, and thus ultimately discipline 
bankers.  But  it  is  hard  to  see  this  as  “inﬂuencing”  banks  managers, 
and it is not necessarily the best way to manage banking failures or 
systemic crises. This leads me to an important dichotomy within the 
tasks of regulatory–supervisory systems: one is to limit the frequency 
of  bank  failures,  the  other  is  to  manage  them  in  the  most  eﬃcient 
way once they become unavoidable. I am not aware of any piece of 
empirical evidence showing that depositors and private investors can 
directly inﬂuence bank managers before their bank becomes distressed 
(i.e., help supervisors in their ﬁrst task). As for the second task (i.e., 
managing closures in the most eﬃcient way), it seems reasonable to 
argue that supervisors should in fact aim at an orderly resolution of 
failures, i.e., exactly preventing depositors and private investors from 
interfering with the closure mechanism. 
15The reason is that subdebt behaves like equity in the region close to liquidation 
(which is precisely the region where inﬂuencing managers becomes crucial) so subdebt 
holders have the some incentives as shareholders to take too much risk. 
16A recent article by Covitz et al. (2003) partially challenges this view. However, Covitz 
et al. (2003) focus exclusively on funding decisions. More speciﬁcally they ﬁnd that in 
the United States riskier banks are less likely to issue subdebt. This does not necessarily 
imply that mandating subdebt issuance would prevent banks from taking too such risk. 11  GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
Using Market Information 
The most convincing mechanism through which market discipline can 
help bank supervision is indirect: by monitoring banks, private investors 
can generate new, “objective” information on the ﬁnancial situation of 
these  banks.  This  information  can  then  be  used  to  complement  the 
information already possessed by supervisors. There is a large academic 
literature on this question.17 Most empirical studies of market discipline 
indeed focus on market monitoring, i.e., indirect market discipline. The 
main question examined by this literature is: what is the informational 
content of prices and returns of the securities issued by banks? More 
precisely,  is  this  information  new  with  respect  to  what  supervisors 
already know? Some authors also examine if bond yields and spreads 
are good predictors of bank risk. 
Flannery (1998) reviews most of the empirical literature on these ques­
tions. More recent contributions are Jagtiani et al. (2000) and De Young 
et al. (2001). The main stylized facts are: 
•	 Bond yields and spreads contain information not contained in reg­
ulatory ratings and vice versa. More precisely, bank closures can be 
predicted more accurately by using both market data and regulatory 
information than by using each of them separately.18 
•	 Subdebt yields typically contain bank risk premiums. However, in 
the United States this is only true since explicit too-big-to-fail poli­
cies were abandoned (that is, after 1985–86). This shows that market 
discipline can work only if regulatory forbearance is not anticipated 
by private investors. 
•	 However, as shown by Covitz et al. (2003), bond and subdebt yields 
can also reﬂect things other than bank risk. In particular, liquidity 
premiums are likely to play an important role. 
In any case, even if there seems to be a consensus that complementing 
the information set of banking supervisors by market information is 
useful, it seems diﬃcult to justify, on the basis of existing evidence, 
mandating all banks to issue subordinated debt for the sole purpose of 
generating additional information. Large banks and U.S. bank holding 
17See, for example, De Young et al. (2001), Evanoﬀ and Wall (2001, 2002, 2003), Flannery 
(1998), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Gropp et al. (2002), Hancock and Kwast (2001), 
Jagtiani et al. (2000), and Pettway and Sinkey (1980). 
18A similar point was made earlier by Pettway and Sinkey (1980). They showed that both 
accounting information and equity returns were useful to predict bank failures. Berger 
et al. (2000) obtain similar conclusions by testing causality relations between changes in 
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companies already issue publicly traded securities, and therefore this 
information is already available, while small banks would probably ﬁnd 
it diﬃcult to issue such securities on a regular basis and the market for 
them would probably not be very liquid.19 
There is also a basic weakness in most empirical studies of indirect 
market discipline: for data availability reasons they have essentially used 
cross-sectional data sets containing a vast majority of well-capitalized 
banks. Remember that the problem at stake is the dynamic behavior 
of  undercapitalized  banks.  Thus  what  we  should  be  interested  in  is 
instead the informational content of subdebt yields for predicting banks’ 
problems. That is, empirical studies should essentially focus on panel 
data and restrict analysis to problem banks. 
Finally, most of the academic literature (both theoretical and empir­
ical) has focused on the asset substitution eﬀect, exempliﬁed by some 
spectacular cases, like those of “zombie” Savings and Loan in the U.S. 
crisis of the 1980s. However, as convincingly argued by Bliss (2001), 
“poor investments are as problematic as excessively risky projects.... 
Evidence  suggests  that  poor  investments  are  likely  to  be  the  major 
explanation for banks getting into trouble.” Thus there is a need for 
a more thorough investigation of the performance of weakly capitalized 
banks:  is  asset  substitution  the  only  problem  or  is  poor  investment 
choice also at stake? 
In fact, the crucial aspect about using market regulation to improve 
banking supervision is probably the possibility of limiting regulatory for­
bearance by triggering PCA, based on “objective” information. As soon 
as stakeholders of any sort (private investors, depositors, managers, 
shareholders or employees of a bank in trouble) can check that super­
visors have done their job, i.e., have reacted soon enough to “objective” 
information (provided by the market) on the bank’s ﬁnancial situation, 
the scope for regulatory forbearance will be extremely limited. Of course, 
the challenge is to design (ex ante) suﬃciently clear rules (i.e., set up a 
clear agenda for the regulatory agency) specifying how regulatory action 
has to be triggered by well-speciﬁed market events. 
How to Integrate Market Discipline and Banking Supervision 
A few conclusions emerge from our short review: 
19The argument that subordinated debt has the same proﬁle as (uninsured) deposits 
and can thus be used to replace forgone market discipline (due to deposit insurance) is 
not convincing. Indeed, as pointed out by Levonian (2001), the proﬁle of subdebt changes 
according to the region of scrutiny: it indeed behaves like deposits (or debt) in the region 
where the bank starts have problems, but like equity when the bank comes closer to the 
failure region. 13  GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
•	 First,  it  seems  that  supervision  and  market  discipline  are  more 
complements  than  substitutes:  one  cannot  work  eﬃciently  with­
out the other. Without credible closure policies implemented by 
supervisors, market discipline is ineﬀective. Conversely, without the 
objective data generated by prices and yields of banks’ bonds and 
equity, closure policy is likely to be plagued by “ambiguity” and 
forbearance. 
•	 Second,  indirect  market  discipline  (private  investors  monitoring 
bank managers) seems to be more empirically relevant than direct 
market  discipline  (private  investors  inﬂuencing  bank  managers). 
Also, mandating all banks to regularly issue a certain type of sub­
ordinated  debt  would  not  generate  a  lot  of  new  information  on 
large bank holding companies (because most of them already issue 
publicly  traded  securities),  but  would  be  very  costly  for  smaller 
banks.20 
•	 Third, more attention should be directed to the precise ways in 
which  supervisory  action  can  be  gradually  triggered  by  market 
signals. Instead of spending so much time and energy reﬁning the 
ﬁrst pillar of the new Basel Accord, the Basel Committee should 
concentrate on this diﬃcult issue, crucial to creating a level playing 
ﬁeld for international banking. 
There is also clearly a lot more to be done, both by academics and 
regulators, if one really wants to understand the interactions between 
banking  supervision  and  market  discipline.  In  particular,  very  little 
attention has been drawn21  so far to macroprudential regulation: how 
to  prevent  and  manage  systemic  banking  crises.  It  seems  clear  that 
market  discipline  is  probably  not  a  good  instrument  for  improving 
macroprudential regulation. Indeed, market signals often become erratic 
during crises, and the very justiﬁcation for macroprudential regulation 
is that markets do not deal eﬃciently with aggregate shocks of suﬃcient 
magnitude. Macroprudential control therefore lies almost exclusively on 
the shoulders of bank supervisors, in coordination with the central bank 
and the Treasury. A diﬃcult question is then how to organize the two 
dimensions (macro and micro) of prudential regulation in such a way 
that systemic crises are eﬃciently managed by governments and central 
banks, while individual bank closure decisions remain protected from 
political interference. 
20The only convincing argument for mandating regular issuance of a standardized 
form of subdebt is that it may improve liquidity of such a market, and therefore increase 
informational content of prices and yields. 
21Borio (2003) is one exception. 